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BERGSON'S RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATION 
OF EVOLUTION" 
T HE center of Bergson's position, the essence of his originality, is the insistence on the reality of time. Time 
is not a moving image of eternity; eternity is rather a frozen 
image of duration. If evolution has meaning, God did not 
rest on the seventh day, for reality is "a creation pursued 
without end." God is perpetual creativity and his nature is 
adumbrated by our living experience with its limited free- 
dom. There is a real future which is bound to follow the 
present, just because all is not pre-determined. "The dura- 
tion of the universe must therefore be one with the latitude 
of creation which can find place in it."' 
Because he saw things in this perspective, Bergson couId 
flatly deny that Herbert Spencer, for example, had an evolu- 
tionary philosophy. Spencer attempted, Bergson thought, to 
reconstruct the process by putting together pieces of the 
product, as if they fitted into the static pattern of a gigantic 
jig-saw puzzle. The same insight enabled Bergson to reject 
post-Kantian idealism, on the ground that it projected a 
picture of reality just as static as that of the mechanists. 
Some Idealists assume that various appearances possess 
reality in varying degree according to a fixed scheme, 
whereas in a world of real change, the very design of the 
world will change with the movement that projects it into 
being. The world as a whole is a concrete duration, con- 
tinually reconstituting itself. The intuition of duration ex- 
poses the mistake in Kant's fixed categories as well as the 
efforts of Spinoza and Leibniz (as Bergson interprets them) 
to graft modem science on ancient metaphysics and ex- 
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plain metaphysically how all is given in advance. Finally, 
the same reason explains why Bergson views the distinction 
of mind and body in Descartes' philosophy as representing 
two incompatible metaphysics: that of free will or creative 
act and that of mechanism. 
If becoming, not being, is the real; if evolution requires 
novelty that cannot be reduced to a rearrangement of pre- 
existent elements; if the phases of activity cannot be fittingly 
represented as a succession of instantaneous states like 
frames of a motion picture film; then what role does matter 
have in Bergsonas philosophy? How indeed can matter differ 
from mere appearance? Can laws and genera, the universals 
of abstract thought, lend facility to action, unless action 
depends on uniformities and stabilities of some sort? Can 
memory trail our whole past after us unless there is deter- 
mination of present by past? Bergson does not fully answer 
questions like these. He suggests that matter is the polar 
opposite of creative activity, namely, repetitive change. 
Nothing purely static can be real, but the creative principle 
needs, he says, ohly to relax its tension-to detend-in order 
to extend, and become repetitive and routine. The distinc- 
tion corresponds to that between craftsmanship and mass 
production. Matter, the principle of relaxation, is the prev- 
alence of fixed habit, of inane repetition, which dully ob- 
structs the eager urgency of life. Creative evolution breaks 
the ties of blind necessity and introduces as nluch indeter- 
mination into matter as possible. One recalls Plato's cosmic 
reason ''persuading" necessity; only in Bergson's case, there 
are no rational forms to give determinate purpose and di- 
rection to persuasion and importance to freedom. In terms 
of bare impetus from behind, without ideal direction or 
immanent pattern, evolution can yield unpredictable nov- 
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elty but not significance, because it contains no principle 
of significance. Emergent novelties are, taken strictly, mere 
differences which make no dgerence. Without some goal, 
design, pattern, tendency, some principle of significant 
emphasis, evolution hardly deserves the epithet "creative." 
Or is creation bare flux? Even Heraclitus, especially Hera- 
clitus, had his Logos. 
Bergson, on the whole, would not have conceded this 
rational claim. But the question may be asked whether the 
philosopher can purchase the advantages of irrationalism 
and voluntarism without paying the price of nihilism. The 
hidden cost of indeterminism and activism is concealed 
from Bergson by an optimistic faith in evolutionary aduance. 
This faith alone justifies the adjective "creative," which im- 
plies both that something new comes to be and that i t  is good. 
Bergson at first offers no arguments to show that evolution 
is good. He assumes that the cosmic impulse is self-justify- 
ing, endIessly self-enriching, and, in fact, divine. 
This goes beyond intuition of real duration; it requires an 
additional act, an act of faith. Even if, as Bergson in the 
end maintains, intuition at its highest pitch merges into 
mystical experience, the religious mystic has never experi- 
enced God as mere impetus towards some nameless future 
of unforeseeable possibilities, but as infinite perfection, 
which out of plenitude of power oveidlows into its creatures. 
The mystic vision may give equal significance to past, pres- 
ent, and future; evolution, if creative, promises more than 
it has yet performed. 
Bergson's strength lay in unwavering insistence that life 
has unrealized opportunities and will always have them, as 
it must be ever active. He therefore sharply rejected every 
attempt to set up a static ideal external to creative activity 
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itself. The fund of potential creation must not be limited, 
Present achievement does not cancel the need for continued 
effort nor diminish the store of what may yet be won. He 
criticized science for reducing the whole order of the 
universe to a fixed pattern, so that, duped by our own 
rigidities, we imagine that all happens of necessity and 
cannot be otherwise. But the upwelling of reality exceeds 
our measure, mocks our all too lucid intellect. We may intuit 
the tendency of the whole, but only with a vague recog- 
nition little better than surmise. Like Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche and James, Bergson resists easy rationalizations 
and seeks the significance of life in a power that breaks 
through ordinary frontiers. But he conceived the problems 
thus raised neither with the intensity of the continental 
thinkers nor with the tentativeness of the pragmatic Ameri- 
can. He also did not, as Whitehead later did (partly under 
Bergson's influence), explore the possibility of re-thinking the 
logic of process. 
Only in his last book did Bergson work out the full sig- 
nificance of creativity as involving not mere novelty but 
improvement, or progress. This aspect long remained im- 
plicit, merged into the image of life as a single continuity 
of effort. Without such. a postulate of progress, evolution 
ends in meaninglessness-novelty without importance. With 
the postulate, evolution acquires a standard or norm to 
direct the course of vital effort. Bergson's thinking, despite 
his criticism of finalism, never excluded faith in an in- 
dwelIing cosmic direction or tendency; he was concerned 
only to deny that success was a foregone conclusion. In his 
later years Bergson ventured to  specify the ultimate direc- 
tion with new confidence and with new depth of religious 
feeling. 
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The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, published in 
1932, when its author was more than seventy years of age, 
extends Bergson's thought in a way that he himself recog- 
nized as new. The antithesis of matter and life, intelIect 
and intuition, reappear in the contrast between c'closed" 
(or customary) and ''open" (as prophetic) morality and re- 
ligion. The world process, however, is no longer viewed as 
undergoing revision as a whole, since a pervasive need now 
seems to give steady direction to it. A yearning for a definite 
achievement determines the work of the open morality and 
dynamic religion, Bergson does not, however, profess to 
know how or whether the achievement will be brought 
about. 
The living impetus is now required to do more than 
introduce indeterminism into matter. Indeterminism is too 
negative an expression for the freedom that hovers before 
Bergson's imagination, He has in view an outgoing of the 
spirit. Life must break the compuIsive hold of customary 
obligation within a closed society in order to fuse the 
solidarity of universal brotherhood. Life must pass beyond 
the protective function of static religion and, nulllfying the 
immemorial power of myth and superstition, release the 
vision of the mystic. What then happens can no longer be 
described bioIogicalIy as a blind struggle of life for expan- 
sion. The whole is a movement of the immanent divine life 
itself, which does not evolve its nature but gradually mani- 
fests or expresses it, as it makes its way against matter 
towards an objective which intuition fitfully appreciates. 
The goal is not a good to be contemplated or finally pos- 
sessed, but a mode of activity after which our inward life 
yearns. Had Bergson re-edited his earlier works in the Iight 
of his last, we may wonder, how would he have annotated 
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them? He was certainly aware that he had departed from 
the empirical basis of fact to enter upon a speculative enter- 
prise,' and admitted that his new views were independent 
of the position reached in Creative Euolution. One may 
agree with Bergson that the new views are compatible with 
the old, and yet perceive that the new speculation-the 
identification of vital impetus with divine love-radically 
alters the center of gravity of his system from natural evolu- 
tion to divine creation. 
I t  is not difEcult to understand why Bergson may have 
been more aware of the continuity of his thought than of 
the profound modification introduced by the new emphasis. 
From the first, he had tended to identify life with a con- 
scious, perhaps even a spiritual, immaterial activity. When 
at length in the maturity of reflective wisdom he saw evolu- 
tionary process as the unfolding of divine love, and made 
of this the heart and center of his philosophy, it seemed to 
him that he was using nothing but what lay at hand. His 
last arguments might with some justice be viewed as at- 
tempts to make good the tacit claims of his thought, for 
which a strictly evolutionary formula makes inadequate 
provision. 
Bergson's philosophy exploited the ambiguity of the no- 
tion of life. The biologist takes as the subject-matter of his 
science the sum of phenomena presented by living things. 
He defines "living in objective terms, characterizing it 
externally by observable modes of behavior of specific 
things, for example, reproduction, inheritance, digestion, 
growth. The biologist himself is an object of his own sci- 
ence; but he is a living being which also daily performs 
functions that fall outside the subject-matter of his science. 
The most obvious example of this is his activity as a sci- 
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entist; and in addition, he hates, fears, feels pride and 
humiliation, and loves; he discharges social duties and per- 
haps performs reIigious rites. In these activities he finds the 
significance of his own life. Apart from them, life reduces 
to an endless round of organic behavior or a meaningless 
display of chance in mutation and natural selection. Bergson's 
interpretation of evolution owes its originality and power, 
as well as its fascination, to his habit of reading all life in 
terms appropriate to his intuition of his own being as an 
integral spirituaI effort. 
The integrity of an act, even the simple act of drawing 
a line or taking a step, forms the pivot of his argument. The 
integrity does not appear, however, to the outward eye, save 
as we read in outward behavior what is obvious to each in 
himself, or as himself. The unity of intention and execution 
resists and eludes analytical fragmentation. Past, present, 
and future interpenetrate one another explicity in the de- 
veloped life of human conscious action. The interpenetra- 
tion is virtual in lower forms of life. At every point, Bergson 
grasped life as effort, inventive effort, aiming after freer 
display of powers, though it is ignorant both of specific 
practical means and clear ideal goals. Life must find ways 
to use matter in order to overcome material obstacles, But 
if life spreads in this way-if it is a single wave or act break- 
ing itself up to overcome specific difficulties by various 
methods, as by instinct and intelligence, for example-then 
life is no routine affair of mutation and selection but the 
creative expansion of significance throughout the dull and 
dead. This is the point to which Bergson shifts the emphasis 
in his last work. In a sense, there is nothing new; but in 
philosophy displacement of emphasis may have transform- 
ing results. What first figured in Bergson's philosophy as a 
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cunning display of living energy comes forth in the end as 
the progressive achievement of divine love. Bergson's ma- 
ture wisdom went beneath all confusions to the religious 
root of the conception of a creative evolution. 
The two sources of mortality and religion correspond to 
the two perspectives mingled by Bergson in all his writing, 
but now sharpened and clarified and possibly purged of 
inner conflict. They may be described most simply-though 
in words not borrowed from Bergson-as mundane and 
divine, as natural and supernatural, as finite and infinite, 
as conservative and creative. One type of morality and 
religion is natural, in the sense that it represents a provi- 
sion of nature useful in the struggle of humans to survive. 
The other type goes beyond nature and bare survival to the 
creative energy that transforms nature and imparts to life 
its true dignity. 
Bergson analyses the morality of obligation in a natural- 
istic, sociological fashion. Obligation is a compulsion im- 
posed on the individual by his social group, but it is not 
merely external, since the individual takes it up into himself 
as his civilized-or, at least, as his socialized-nature. Bergson 
rejects a prior; formalism of the Kantian type and eveiy 
other theory that offers to rationalize obligation so as to 
disguise its true origin in social pressure. We may compare 
and balance obligations, but that is possible only because 
first of all there are obligations to balance and reason about. 
Bergson does not make the mistake of some evolutionary 
philosophers, who attempt to derive the sense of moral 
obligation from the fact of social pressure. If there is an 
evolution of morals, Bergson considers it to involve the 
coming of obligation as something wholly new into the 
world, Force is not obligation. The compulsion of society 
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works with the aid of force, but only to reinforce obligation, 
which expresses the universal human need of a solid group. 
Obligation is almost like an instinct. It is a natural human 
way of meeting the demands of life. 
This natural or customa~y morality is the morality of the 
closed society; it implies the separation of one social group 
from another and their mutual indifference, if not suspicion 
and hostility. War naturally follows from such social ex- 
clusiveness. Society based on morality of this character 
resembles a colony of mutually supporting cells or relatively 
independent organisms, which individually and collectively 
take no interest in the well-being of other colonies. Bergson 
regards this development at the end of one great line of 
evolutionary advance as exactly parallel to the instinctive 
articuIation of insect societies at the end of the other great 
line, 
I t  will be recalled in this connection that Bergson pic- 
tures the entire process of organic evolution as foIlowing 
two chief thoroughfares: instinct and intelligence. Instinct 
culminates in the life of hive and anthill, which is sustained 
by the "somnambulistic" automatism of the individual bees 
and ants. They act instinctively; they severally always 
"know" what to do, having no genuine choice of alterna- 
tives, since their functions are predetermined by their struc- 
tures. Alternatives cannot present themselves to such beings. 
In the other line of advance, intelligence culminates in the 
deliberately hesitating, inventive, resourceful action of men; 
but to secure social solidarity sufficient for survival, a social 
limitation had to be imposed upon alternatives otherwise 
available to individuals. The group mores serve the needs 
of life by reducing the dangers inherent in the asbitarary or 
willful freedom of individuals. Obligation among men plays 
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the part of instinct among social insects, and like instinct 
tends to merge into habit and unconsciousness. 
It is the same with static religion, which, for Bergson, 
is a "natural" religion in an almost biological sense. The 
only animal endowed with high intelligence, man is also the 
only animal who makes myths and who engages in religious 
practices. As Bergson puts it, "Homo sapiens, the only crea- 
ture endowed with reason, is also the only creature to pin 
its existence to things unrea~onable."~ These unique activi- 
ties are neither exceptional nor late among men, but seem 
to be found from the very earliest times. Bergson relates the 
two distinguishing characteristics of human life to each 
other, and interprets primitive religion as an instinctive 
provision, by which nature guards man against the chronic 
anxieties to which farsighted intelligence miserably exposes 
him. Religious rites and myth-making secure confident action 
in the face of various evils which intelligence recognizes. 
Thus in general, religion appears as "a defensive reaction 
of nature against the dissolvent power of intelligence."* The 
inventive initiative of intelligence tends to set the individual 
at odds with his group; but the surviving remnant of in- 
stinct, though eclipsed by intelligence, projects a counter- 
feit recollection or illusory perception to preserve the co- 
hesiveness of the community. A guardian divinity protects 
the city. Bergson at once sets about rendering this Egura- 
tive account in more literal terms, but we need not repeat 
the details. Broadly speaking, his method consists in postu- 
lating an instinctive activity which is first disturbed by the 
intrusion of intelligence and then restored by representa- 
tions evoked by instinct in terms borrowed from intelligence. 
From the point of view of a primitive group, cohesion is 
achieved by custom; morality is custom, and it is coexten- 
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sive with primitive religion, for religion forbids departure 
from custom. Primitive religion may thus be considered "a 
precaution against the danger man runs, as soon as he thinks 
s t  all, of thinking himself aloney'-"a defensive reaction of 
nature against intelligen~e."~ Mythology will eventually 
spring from this reaction, but, "like flower-bearing plants," 
it is a late product of nature. There will be first a simpler 
system of taboos, by which the prollibition becomes installed 
in the thing-the dynamic in the static-without leading to 
the projection of a complete personality, or a god. 
Another product of developed intelligence is the idea of 
death, the certainty of each that he must die. Animals do 
not know this; they simply live. But men must live in the 
face of inevitable death, and may hesitate in the move- 
ments of life because of this. The threat of despondency 
is countered by nature with the image of a continuation of 
life beyond death, and the balance is restored in favor of 
effective living. From this point of view, "religion is a 
defensive reaction of nature against the representation, by 
intelligence, of the inevitability of death."" 
An intelligence that can compare experiences, generalize, 
and look ahead, will become aware of the risks attending 
action, of the vast gulf between intention and execution. We 
can set a mechanism going but it often fails of its end-the 
hurled spear misses the mark. Religion reacts by forming 
representations of favorable powers which can be invoked 
to guarantee successful action. The optimism of life is re- 
stored. Religion once more appears in the guise of a defen- 
sive reaction of nature against intelligence; in this case, 
against inteuigent recognition of "a depressing margin of 
the unexpected between the initiative taken and the effect 
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desired."' Eventually the world becomes populated with all 
manner of unseen powers. 
Such defensive reactions produce in the course of time 
the whole array of magical practices, animal and spirit wor- 
ship, gods, mythology, superstitions of all kinds. Bergson 
attempts to treat them as complex exfoliations from a single 
- 
stem. Static religion springs from the demands of natural 
life. 
Like closed morality, static religion serves men, but only 
at the cost of losing touch with the vital impetus. Attach- 
ment to this impetus produces open morality and dynamic 
religion. Dynamic religion does not need to resort to myth 
and superstition to accomplish all that static religion does in 
lending confidence and serenity to men that they may act. 
It does not need to tell tales, as if to comfort frightened 
children, for it works by attaching men to their creative 
source, whence flows into them a love of all men. The love 
of humanity does not result from simply enlarging the in- 
group of closed morality, but differs from closed morality 
in kind, being the work of an agency altogether difFerent 
from nature. 
Intuition once again redeems intelligence, but now it has 
become frankly mystical. Mysticism consummates the "fringe 
of intuition" surrounding intelligence. Intelligence serves 
particular ends of action and may spin theories. The mystic 
soul does not speculate about the real and takes no interest 
in particular ends. 
I t  would be content to feel itself pervaded, though retain- 
ing its own personality, by a being immeasurably mightier 
than itself, just as an iron is pervaded by the fire which 
makes it glow. Its attachment to life would henceforth be 
its inseparability from this principle, joy in joy, love of that 
which is all love. In addition it would give itself to society, 
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but to a society comprising all humanity, loved in the love 
of the principle underlying it. The confidence which static 
religion brought to man would thus be transfigured: no 
more thought fur the morrow, no more anxious heart-search- 
ing. . . . Now detachment from each particular thing would 
become attachment to life in general.8 
Few men achieve the mystic's concentration. Had many 
done so, nature would not have stopped at the human spe- 
cies, for the great mystic transcends man. The ultimate end 
of mysticism is the establishment of partial coincidence with 
the creativity of life. "This effort is of God, if it is not God 
him~elf."~ By transcending material limitation, the mystic 
must be considered to extend divine action. 
Bergson criticizes Greek and Hindu mysticism on the 
same grounds. Except for the supreme Christian mystics, 
all have stopped short of the final stage, never reaching the 
point where "contemplation is engulfed in action," and the 
human will becomes at one with the divine will. The Greek 
felt action to be a weakening of contemplation. The Hindu 
often felt life to be "unremitting cruelty," and his problem 
was how to escape from it. Bergson opposes to both of these, 
the "complete" mysticism of "action, creation, love." 
Beyond ecstasy comes action; between them lies the great 
mystic's "darkest night." The night ends when the soul 
completes its metamorphosis from vision to volition, from 
<< 
seeing" God to becoming his instrument. God then acts 
through the soul, and the soul swells with superabundance 
of life. I t  sees and speaks and acts simply, but works at 
vast enterprises. "For the love which consumes him is no 
longer simply the love of man for God, it is the love of God 
for all men. Through God, in the strength of God, he loves 
all mankind with a divine 10ve."'~ Such love as that is neither 
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instinctive nor intellectual, but forms the source of all in- 
stinct and all intelligence. Bergson says that God needs 
men, that he may love them; hence, he undertook "to create 
creators, that he may have, besides himself, beings worthy 
<L 
of his love."" What the mystic love wants to do, wit11 
God's help, is to complete the creation of the human species 
and make of humanity what it would have straightaway be- 
come, had it been able to assume its final shape without the 
assistance of man himself."12 
This last quotation with its nascent finalism, throws spe- 
cial light on Bergson's concluding declaration that "men do 
not sdiciently realize that their future is in their own 
hands."13 He means so much more than the commonplaces 
of recent naturalistic humanism that the more amounts to 
an antithesis. "Theirs the responsibility, then, for deciding 
if they . . . intend to make just the extra effort required for 
fulfilling, even on their refractory planet, the essential func- 
tion of the universe, which is a machine for the making of 
gods."'4 
At first glance far removed from the more naturalistic 
spirit of Crentive Evolution, this conclusion seems to do no 
more than expose to full view at last the religious root of 
Bergson's whole career as a metaphysician. I t  seems almost 
as if all that has happened has come about through a shift 
of attention from the facts of evolution to the significance 
of the creativeness which he found in them. Bergson at no 
time pared creation down to the simple emergence of nov- 
elty. Creativity implies enhancement of spiritual significance, 
so that in the end life and religion are for Bergson one and 
the same. 
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